The particular proposition is about the work of Isaiah Berlin.
Berlin, supposedly one of our greatest interpreters of Enlightenment thinking, had very little to say about this heritage of thought and these achievements. I have ransacked his work and I mean it: there is almost nothing on Enlightenment constitutionalism in his writings-some few rags and paltry blurred shreds of paper here and there;
nothing of any significance.
You will balk at this proposition. You will say: what about the insistent theme in all of Berlin's essays cautioning us against perfectionist projects and against the ideation of a perfect society in which all values will be integrated harmoniously and commensurably, and in which conflict among the solutions to each and all of the problems of mankind will be precluded by the unity of the standard that makes each of solutions rational. 3 What about his warning? Isn't that his verdict on Enlightenment constitutionalism?
No it is not. For in none of that does he really address the idea of constitutional structure, the possibility of institutionalized forms that will house rather than try to abolish human imperfection, protecting liberty and ethical pluralism and providing a modest institutional structure with which security and the general good can be promoted through representation and the rule of law, without anything approaching the hubris of totalitarian utopianism. Isaiah Berlin said nothing about that. He proceeded in his work as though all attempts at social and political design were on a par, and as though everything invested in the 18 th century constitutionalist enterprise was beneath comment.
3 Cf. Berlin, "Political Ideas in the 20 th Century," in Liberty, ed. Hardy, p. 62; or as Berlin describes the Enlightenment aspiration in "Two Concepts of Liberty," ibid., p. 193: "All true solutions to all genuine problems must be compatible: more than this, they must fit into a single whole; for this is what is meant by calling them rational and the universe harmonious." Why? Well, an unkind interpretation would be that Berlin remained silent about Enlightenment constitutionalism because it challenged-it was a most glaring counter-example to-his thesis about the dire consequences of Enlightenment rationalism. Having committed himself to this thesis at an early stage in his career, he was not about to endanger it by identifying the one strain of rationalist constructivism that offered to refute his central concern.
I am sorry to say that one cannot read into this area without entertaining that hypothesis. But it is a frightful thing to say about a public intellectual. I think Berlin deserves our charity, and maybe the more charitable explanation is that he just wasn't interested in law, constitutions, or institutional politics generally. For some reason he didn't think that political philosophers should really be preoccupied with all that. I'll say more about possible biographical explanations at the end of this talk. 26 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," pp. 8-9: "The greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally. … Thus a society in which freedom under external laws is connected to the highest possible degree with irresistible power, that is, a perfectly just civil constitution, must be the highest goal of nature for the human species. … This problem is both the most difficult and also the last to be solved by the human species. … [I]ndeed, its perfect solution is impossible: nothing entirely straight can be fashioned from the crooked wood of which humankind is made. Nature has charged us only with approximating this idea That this task is also the last to be carried out also follows from the fact that such a constitution requires the right conception of its nature, a great store of experience practiced in many affairs of the world, and, above all of this, a good will that is prepared to accept such a constitution" (8: 22-3) 27 Voltaire, "Thoughts on Public Administration" (1752) 
Enlightenment constitutionalism

Design and humility
The thing that is so fascinating in Enlightenment constitutionalism is that all this is presented as a project of deliberate design. constitute governments as well as restrict them, to empower as well as to limit-particularly in the case of popular republics that aim to empower those who would ordinarily be without power in a society.
But, sure, limiting government in the interest of liberty is certainly one thing that constitutions do, and of course it was a concern of Enlightenment constitutionalism. And since individual liberty was something that Isaiah Berlin did write about, he might have been expected to approach the topic of constitutionalism at least from this angle; he might have been alert to, and alerted his readers to, what had been done on this front in Enlightenment political thought.
Not a bit of it. In fact Berlin said next to nothing in his published work about the constitutional devices that might be used to 43 William Galston, "Constitutional Pluralism," Social Philosophy and Policy, 28 (2011) , 228, actually does put Berlin's pluralism to work in thinking about constitutional structure.
uphold the negative liberty that interested him-"freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others … the absence of bullying or domination." 44 He wrote next to nothing about the institutional mechanisms that might secure the modicum of liberty he thought was ethically required for each person-"a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated." 45 He was interested only in debating with the philosophes aboutt liberty was, not about how it was to be secured.
He did say that "there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should be permitted to cross." 46 But he betrayed no scintilla of interest in the question that exercised Madison and both his friends and opponents in the American ratification process-about what good "parchment barriers" could do, and whether the frontiers of freedom were better secured by the structural principles of a constitution than by a dedicated bill of rights.
47
One thing we may infer is that Berlin would not have accepted Sieyès's suggestion that "political rights are the only guarantee of civil rights and individual liberty," and that we can secure liberty only by "knowing and taking possession of our political rights." 48 Though
Berlin sometimes used the phrase "political liberty" to refer to his In all of this, it is not Berlin's general hostility to democracy and participatory liberty that concerns me. 59 That's a matter of record.
58 Berlin had no interest in Locke's speculation about the combination of representation, the rule of law, and the separation of powers as a partial security against oppression. I mean Locke's argument for investing legislative power in a large representative assembly Locke, Two Treatises, 329-30 (II, §94) Legislative authority should be placed, he says, insisting that the laws they make should be general in form and that the enforcement of the law should be separated from institutions devoted to their enactment. That way, legislators would be given pause by the thought that they and their families would have to bear the burden of any oppressive laws they enacted. 59 If it were, we would have to consider the rough, crude, and almost telegraphic notes that Berlin for his lecture 'Democracy, Communism and the Individual ' (1949 organization, the relations of the individual to the community, the state, and the relations of communities and states to each other." But he gave no indication that "political organization" was worth study in its own right.
To read almost any of Berlin's work, whether it addresses the Enlightenment or not, is to read essays that are resolutely uninterested in the political institutions of liberal society. As I have already said, beyond airy talk of freedom and openness, Berlin was simply unconcerned with the ways in which liberal or democratic political institutions might accommodate the pluralism and untidiness he thought so important in human life.
The consequences of neglect
Whatever the explanation, the blind-spot on Enlightenment constitutionalism has done political theory no service. Pedagogically, it has been detrimental to the theory of politics in England: Berlin set an example to his students and followers; his lack of interest in institutions and constitutions has turned out to be contagious and it has contaminated the theory of politics as we see it and know it today.
We study justice and the meaning of liberty; we don't study bit of disrespect, then so be it. The old man's reputation can take it.
